“New Millennium Development Goals: A New Version, an Old Wish List,” authored with Mitu Sengupta, in Economic & Political Weekly September 28, 2013 Vol XLVIII No 39, 23–25.
“Concluding Reflections,” in Gillian Brock, ed.: Cosmopolitanism versus Non-Cosmopolitanism: Critiques, Defenses, Reconceptualizations (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2013), 294–320.
“How We Count Hunger Matters,” authored with Frances Moore Lappé, Jennifer Clapp, Molly Anderson, Robin Broad, Ellen Messer,and Timothy Wise, Ethics & International Affairs, 27/3 (2013), 251–259.
“Universal Agenda on the Multiple Dimensions of Poverty,” authored with Nicole Rippin, background research paper submitted to the High Level Panel on the Post-2015 Development Agenda, May 2013.
“Transcending the Washington View of Development,” in Saju Chackalackal, ed.: Towards a Strong Global Economic System: Revealing the Logic of Gratuitousness in the Market Economy (Bangalore: Dharmaram Publications 2013), 73–101.
“Poverty and Violence,” in Law, Ethics and Philosophy 1/1 (2013), 87–111.
Abstract: Citizens of affluent countries bear a far greater responsibility for world poverty than they typically realise. This is so because poverty is more severe, more widespread and more avoidable than officially acknowledged and also because it is substantially aggravated by supranational institutional arrangements that are designed and imposed by the governments and elites of the more powerful states. It may seem that this analysis of world poverty implies that citizens of affluent countries have forfeited their right not to be killed in the course of a redistributive war and that such a war would be both just and permissible. In fact, however, it has none of these three implications. This finding should be welcomed insofar as violence and macho talk of violence are in our world highly counterproductive responses to the injustice of poverty.
“Global Poverty as an Institutional Human Rights Violation,” Die Neue Gesellschaft Frankfurter Hefte 1/2013, 27–32. German
“Poverty, Hunger and Cosmetic Progress,” in Malcolm Langford, Andy Sumner and Alicia Ely Yamin, eds.: The Millennium Development Goals and Human Rights: Past, Present and Future (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2013), 209–231.
“Cosmopolitanism: a Path to Peace and Justice” in Journal of East-West Thought, No. 4, Vol. 2, December 2012, 9–32.
“Outreach, Impact, Collaboration: Why Academics Should Join to Stand Against Poverty,” authored with Luis Cabrera, in Ethics and International Affairs, Special Issue: Academics Stand Against Poverty, 26/2 (2012), 163–182. Spanish
“Are We Violating the Human Rights of the World’s Poor?” in Yale Human Rights & Development Law Journal 14:2 (2011), 1–33: Winner of the 2013 Gregory Kavka Prize in political philosophy administered by the American Philosophical Association; also in Thomas Pogge and Luis Cabrera: Perspectives on Global Poverty (New Delhi: Academics Stand Against Poverty and Developing Countries Research Centre 2011), 1–39; revised version in Jens Holst, ed.: Global Social Protection Scheme: Moving from Charity to Solidarity (Frankfurt: Medico International and Merelbeke: Hélène de Beir Foundation 2012), 60–76; revised version in David Kinley, Wojciech Sadurski, and Kevin Walton, eds.: Human Rights: Old Problems, New Possibilities (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 2013), 40–72. Hindi Chinese Ukrainian
Abstract: A human rights violation involves unfulfilled human rights and a specific active causal relation of human agents to such non-fulfillment. This causal relation may be interactional; but it may also be institutional, as when agents collaborate in designing and imposing institutional arrangements that foreseeably and avoidably cause human rights to be unfulfilled. Readily available evidence suggests that (a) basic social and economic human rights remain unfulfilled for around half the world’s population and (b) the design of supranational institutional arrangement plays a major role in explaining why the poorer half of humanity is suffering a rapid decline in its share (now below three percent) of global household income. A strong case can be made, then, that people like myself – well-to-do citizens of influential states – collaboratively violate the human rights of the global poor on a massive scale. That most of us find this conclusion obviously mistaken does not discredit it because they have not investigated the institutional causes of the non-fulfillment of human rights nor relevant institutional reform possibilities.
“Dignity and Global Justice” forthcoming in Marcus Düwell, Jens Braarvig, Roger Brownsword, and Dietmar Mieth, eds.: Cambridge Handbook on Human Dignity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2014). Japanese
Abstract: With strong resonance across cultures, the word “dignity” has become increasingly prominent in international law and in discussions of global justice. It is used in two distinct but closely related senses. In one sense, dignity is a high worth which all human beings possess as human beings and which commands that they be treated with respect and consideration. In another sense, dignity is a characteristic of human lives that, for many, remains yet to be achieved. Because human beings have dignity in the first sense, it is imperative to enable them to lead a life in dignity. This paper explicates the two related senses of “dignity” and explores how they can inform and support a conception of global justice and efforts at its realization.
“Concluding Remarks: Discourse versus Strategy” in Brad Jessup and Kim Rubenstein: Environmental Discourses in Public and International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2012), 436–447.
“Allowing the Poor to Share the Earth” in Journal of Moral Philosophy 8/3 (2011), 335–352.
Abstract: Two of the greatest challenges facing humanity are environmental degradation and the persistence of poverty. Both can be met by instituting a Global Resources Dividend (GRD) that would slow pollution and natural-resource depletion while raising funds for averting poverty worldwide. Unlike Hillel Steiner’s Global Fund, which is presented as a fully just regime governing the use of planetary resources, the GRD is meant as merely a modest but realistic step toward justice. Paula Casal has set forth various ways in which this step might be improved upon. Solid counter-arguments can be given to her criticisms and suggestions. But to specify the best (effective and realizable) design of an appropriate global institutional mechanism with some confidence, economists, political scientists, jurists, environmental scientists, and activists would need to be drawn in to help think through the immense empirical and political complexities posed by the urgent task.
“Divided against Itself: Aspiration and Reality of International Law” in James Crawford and Martti Koskenniemi, eds.: The Cambridge Companion to International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2012), 373–397.
“Responses to Critics” in Alison M. Jaggar, ed.: Thomas Pogge and His Critics (Cambridge: Polity Press 2010), 175–250. Critics: Joshua Cohen, Kok-Chor Tan, Neera Chandhoke, Jiwei Ci, Erin I Kelly and Lionel K. McPherson, Leif Wenar, Charles W. Mills. Spanish
“Human Rights and Global Wrongs” in Reflections — A Magazine of Theological and Ethical Inquiry (Fall 2010), 44–46.
“Keynote Address: Poverty, Climate Change, and Overpopulation” in Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law 38 (2010), 525–542.
“How Not to Count the Poor,” authored with Sanjay Reddy, in Sudhir Anand, Paul Segal and Joseph Stiglitz, eds.: Debates on the Measurement of Global Poverty (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2010), 42–85. German
Abstract: The estimates of the extent, distribution and trend of global income poverty provided in the World Bank’s World Development Reports for 1990 and 2000/01 are neither meaningful nor reliable. The Bank uses an arbitrary international poverty line unrelated to any clear conception of what poverty is. It employs a misleading and inaccurate measure of purchasing power “equivalence” that vitiates international and intertemporal comparisons of income poverty. It extrapolates incorrectly from limited data and thereby creates an appearance of precision that masks the high probable error of its estimates. The systematic distortion introduced by these three flaws likely leads to a large understatement of the extent of global income poverty and to an incorrect inference that it has declined. A new methodology of global poverty assessment is feasible and necessary.
“How Many Poor People Should There Be? A Rejoinder to Ravallion” in Sudhir Anand, Paul Segal and Joseph Stiglitz, eds.: Debates on the Measurement of Global Poverty (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2010), 102–114.
“The Role of International Law in Reproducing Massive Poverty” in Samantha Besson and John Tasioulas, eds.: The Philosophy of International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2010), 417–435.
“World Poverty” in John Skorupski, ed.: Routledge Companion to Ethics (London: Routledge 2010), 796–807.
“Baselines for Determining Harm” in Joel Rosenthal and Christian Barry, eds.: Ethics and International Affairs (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press 2009), 329–34.
“Poverty” in Berkshire Encyclopedia of Sustainability (Vol. 1): The Spirit of Sustainability (Great Barrington MA: Berkshire Publishing Group 2009), 317–320.
“Concluding Remarks” in Jeremy Farrall and Kim Rubenstein, eds.: Sanctions, Accountability, and Governance in a Globalised World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2009), 407–417.
“Developing Morally Plausible Indices of Poverty and Gender Equity: A Research Program” in Alison Jaggar, ed.: Global Gender Justice, special issue of Philosophical Topics 37/2 (2009), 199–221; integrated into Politics as Usual as chapter 4. German Spanish French
“How World Poverty is Measured and Tracked” in Rights and Development Bulletin 1/10 (2008), 5–13; reprinted in Absolute Poverty and Global Justice as chapter 3.
Abstract: In 2015, the world will celebrate the achievement of the first Millennium Development Goal (MDG-1): to halve world poverty by 2015. But this foreseeable achievement crucially depends on how poverty is being measured and tracked. It depends on choosing an extremely low international poverty line: people are counted as poor only if the cost in local currency of their entire annual consumption has less purchasing power than $456 had in the US in 2005. By setting the international poverty line at twice this level, one would turn a 23% decline in the number of poor during 1990–2005 into a 2% increase. The achievement of MDG-1 also crucially depends on two reinterpretations of what it means to halve poverty by 2015. After promising to halve the number of poor people, then the proportion of poor in world population, the world’s governments have now settled on halving the proportion of poor among the (faster-growing) population of the developing countries. They have also back-dated the beginning of the MDG period to 1990 (with the result that MDG-1 was fully achieved in the world’s most populous region one full year before this goal had even been adopted!). These two revisions raise the number of those whose extreme poverty in 2015 will be deemed morally acceptable from 836 million to 1327 million — and they ensure that a 21% reduction in the number of poor during 2000–2015 suffices for success. The achievement of MDG-1 will owe much more to the clever shifting of goalposts than to reductions in world poverty.
“Introduction to the Two-Volume Collection” in Thomas Pogge and Keith Horton, eds.: Global Ethics: Seminal Essays (St. Paul, MN: Paragon House 2008), xiii-xxiv, and in Thomas Pogge and Darrel Moellendorf, eds.: Global Justice: Seminal Essays (St. Paul, MN: Paragon House 2008), xiii-xxiv.
“Growth and Inequality: Understanding Recent Trends and Political Choices” in Dissent 55/1 (Winter 2008), 66–75; thoroughly updated reprint “Growth is Good! — but What Growth?” in Ayelet Banai, Miriam Ronzoni, and Christian Schemmel, eds.: Social Justice, Global Dynamics: Theoretical and Empirical Perspectives (London: Routledge 2011), 77–94; updated version in Politics as Usual, chapter 5. German Italian Chinese Spanish
“Cosmopolitanism” in Robert Goodin, Philip Pettit, and Thomas Pogge, eds.: A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy, second edition (Oxford: Blackwell 2007), 312–331. Chinese
“Severe Poverty as a Human Rights Violation” in Thomas Pogge, ed.: Freedom from Poverty as a Human Right: Who Owes What to the Very Poor? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, and Paris: UNESCO 2007), 11–53; reprinted in Ronald Labonte, Katia Mohindra, Ted Schrecker and Kirsten Stoebenau: Global Health, volume 4 Global Health Ethics, Public Policy and Challenges for the Future (London: Sage 2011). Italian Spanish
“Reframing Global Economic Security and Justice” in David Held and Anthony McGrew, eds.: Globalization Theory: Approaches and Controversies (Cambridge: Polity Press 2007), 207–224.
“Moral Priorities for International Human Rights NGOs” in Daniel A. Bell and Jean-Marc Coicaud, eds.: Ethics in Action: The Ethical Challenges of International Human Rights Nongovernmental Organizations (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2007), 218–256; abbreviated and updated version “How International NGOs Should Act” in Giving Well as chapter 3. Spanish
Abstract: For a world in which the resources of INGOs fall short dramatically of the needs they seek to meet, I propose and critically discuss a principle for setting priorities: Other things being equal, an INGO should govern its decision making about candidate projects by such rules and procedures as are expected to maximize its long-run cost effectiveness, defined as the expected aggregate moral value of the projects it undertakes divided by the expected aggregate cost of these projects. Here aggregate moral value, or harm protection, is the sum of the moral values of the harm reductions (and increases) these projects bring about for the individual persons they affect.
“Respect and Disagreement: A Response to Joseph Carens” in Daniel A. Bell and Jean-Marc Coicaud, eds.: Ethics in Action: The Ethical Challenges of International Human Rights Nongovernmental Organizations (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2007), 273–278.
“Unknown: Extent, Distribution and Trend of Global Income Poverty” (Thomas Pogge and Sanjay Reddy) in Economic and Political Weekly 41/22 (June 3–9, 2006), 2241–2247; reprinted in Bharti Thakar, ed.: Global Poverty: Eradication Strategies (Hyderabad: ICFAI University Press 2007), 25–45. Catalan Spanish
“Moralizing Humanitarian Intervention: Why Jurying Fails and How Law Can Work” in Terry Nardin and Melissa Williams, eds.: Humanitarian Intervention, NOMOS volume 47 (New York: New York University Press 2005), 158–187; integrated into Politics as Usual as chapter 8. Spanish
Abstract: A critique of the proposal by Kofi Annan and Thomas Franck for relaxing the UN Charter constraints on humanitarian intervention.
“Recognized and Violated by International Law: The Human Rights of the Global Poor” in Leiden Journal of International Law 18/4 (2005), 717–745; reprinted with revisions in Berma Klein Goldewijk, ed.: Religion, International Relations and Development Cooperation (Wageningen NL: Wageningen Academic Publishers 2007), 79–112; integrated into Politics as Usual as chapter 2. Portuguese Spanish French German Czech Chinese
Abstract: Various human rights are widely recognized in codified and customary international law. These human rights promise all human beings protection against specific severe harms that might be inflicted on them domestically or by foreigners. Yet, international law also establishes and maintains institutional structures that greatly contribute to these human rights not being fulfilled: Fundamental components of international law systematically obstruct the aspirations of poor populations for democratic self-government, civil rights, and minimal economic sufficiency. And central international organizations, like the WTO, IMF, and World Bank, are designed so that they systematically contribute to the persistence of severe poverty. On the most plausible construal of the duties that human rights impose, those contributing to the design or imposition of such institutional structures are violating the human rights of the global poor.
“World Poverty and Human Rights” in Ethics and International Affairs 19/1 (2005), 1–7; reprinted in Judith Boss, ed.: Analyzing Moral Issues, 4th edition, (Columbus OH: McGraw-Hill 2007); reprinted in Joel Rosenthal and Christian Barry, eds.: Ethics and International Affairs (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press 2009), 307–15; reprinted with revisions in Matt Zwolinski, ed.: Arguing about Political Philosophy (New York: Routledge 2009), 558–564; reprinted in Steven Cahn and Robert Talisse, eds.: Political Philosophy in the Twenty-First Century (Boulder: Westview Press 2012), 253–260.
Abstract: Introducing the symposium on my book (of the same title), I sketch its three main (parallel) lines of argument: The present radical inequality of life chances is unjust in virtue of its actual history, in virtue of depriving the global poor of a fair share in the benefits from the use of planetary resources, and in virtue of its being sustained by a global institutional order that foreseeably produces avoidable massive human rights deficits. All three arguments reach the conclusion that, by defending the present radically unequal distribution, the affluent countries and their citizens are harming the global poor. This conclusion differs from the usual presentations of world poverty according to which its causes are local and our duties in regard to it are positive ones of charity, aid, and assistance.
“Severe Poverty as a Violation of Negative Duties” in Ethics and International Affairs 19/1 (2005), 55–83.
Abstract: Responding to five critics, I address the objections each of them has made. Against Mathias Risse, I show that economic progress over the last two centuries cannot support his view that the present global order is imperfectly developed rather than unjust and that its coercive imposition is not a harm done to the global poor. Against Alan Patten, I show that my view escapes the dilemma he poses by invoking more than a minimalist procedural conception of justice and yet less than a maximalist substantive one that would involve me in stretching the meaning of “harm” beyond recognition. In response to Rowan Cruft, I clarify that I do not mean to deny (or assert) that human rights entail positive duties, that I focus however on human-rights-imposed negative duties, and that such negative duties may trigger positive obligations (e.g., to help reform unjust social institutions and to protect their victims). Against Norbert Anwander, I defend my claim that there is a negative duty not to take advantage of injustice which is distinct from, and not reducible to, the negative duty not to contribute to injustice. And in response to Debra Satz I correct some common misunderstandings and then elaborate who should count as a participant in the design or imposition of unjust social institutions and what such individuals should reasonably demand of themselves.
“The First UN Millennium Development Goal: a Cause for Celebration?” in Journal of Human Development 5/3 (2004), 377–397, and in Real World Justice, 317–338 (ch.18); updated version in Politics as Usual, chapter 3. Spanish German
Abstract: The first and most prominent UN Millennium Development Goal has been widely celebrated. Yet, four reflections should give us pause. Though retaining the idea of “halving extreme poverty by 2015,” MDG-1 in fact sets a much less ambitious target than had been agreed to at the 1996 World Food Summit in Rome: that the number of poor should be reduced by 19 (rather than 50) percent, from 1094 to 883.5 million. Tracking the $1/day poverty headcount, the World Bank uses a highly unreliable method and may thus be painting far too rosy a picture of the evolution of extreme poverty. Shrinking the problem of extreme poverty, which now causes some 18 million deaths annually, by 19 percent over 15 years is grotesquely underambitious in view of resources available and the magnitude of the catastrophe. Finally, this go-slow approach is rendered even more appalling by the contribution made to the persistence of severe poverty by the affluent countries and the global economic order they impose. An apparently generous gesture toward the global poor helps conceal the largest crime against humanity ever committed. (See Politics as Usual for updated data.)
“‘Assisting’ the Global Poor” in Deen K. Chatterjee, ed.: The Ethics of Assistance: Morality and the Distant Needy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2004), 260–288; also in Ioanna Kuçuradi, ed.: The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy, Volume 13: Philosophy Facing World Problems (Ankara: Philosophical Society of Turkey 2007), 189–215; reprinted in Tamar Szabo Gendler, Susanna Siegel, and Steven M. Cahn, eds.: The Elements of Philosophy (New York: Oxford University Press 2008), 161–173; in Global Ethics: Seminal Essays; in Walter Carlsnaes and Stefano Guzzini, eds.: Foreign Policy Analysis (London: SAGE Publications 2011); in Sebastiano Maffettone and Aakash Singh Rathore, eds.: Global Justice: Critical Perspectives (New Delhi: Routledge, 2012), 32–57; and in Christian Barry and Holly Lawford-Smith, eds.: Global Justice, The Library of Essays on Justice, Volume 2 (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2012), 67–95. French German Chinese Spanish Dutch
Abstract: We citizens of the affluent countries tend to discuss our obligations toward the distant needy in terms of donations and transfers, assistance and redistribution: “How much of our wealth, if any, should we give away to the hungry abroad?” This way of conceiving the problem is a serious moral error, and a very costly one for the global poor. It depends on the false belief — widespread in the rich countries — that the causes of the persistence of severe povery are wholly indigenous to the countries in which it occurs. There are indeed national and local factors that contribute to persistent poverty in developing countries. But global institutional rules also play an important role in its reproduction, in part by sustaining the national and local factors that affluent Westerners most like to blame for the problem. Since these rules are shaped by our governments, in our name, we bear moral responsibility not merely by assisting the distant poor too little, but also, and more significantly, by harming them too much.
Abstract: The increasingly widespread expression “global justice” marks an important shift in the structure of our moral discourse. Traditionally, international relations were seen as sharply distinct from the domain of domestic justice. The former focused on interactions among states, while the latter evaluated the design of a national institutional order in light of its effects on its individual participants. Such institutional moral analysis is and should now be applied to supranational institutional arrangements which are becoming ever more pervasive and important for the life prospects of individuals. The traditional lens presents fair agreements among (internally just or unjust) sovereign states. The new lens shows a deeply unjust global institutional order that enriches elites in both rich and poor countries while perpetuating the oppression and impoverishment of a majority of the human population.
“Human Rights and Human Responsibilities” in Ciaran Cronin and Pablo De Greiff, eds.: Global Justice and Transnational Politics (Cambridge MA: MIT Press 2002), 151–195; reprinted with revisions in Andrew Kuper, ed.: Global Responsibilities: Who Must Deliver on Human Rights? (London: Routledge 2005), 3–35. Spanish
Abstract: Large segments of humankind are so poor that their social and economic and often their civil and political human rights remain unfulfilled. Who bears what responsibilities toward solving this problem? A recently proposed ‘Universal Declaration of Human Responsibilities’ provides no answers. Against competing interpretations of the responsibilities entailed by the ‘Universal Declaration of Human Rights’, §28 of this Declaration suggests that human rights give those subjected to an institutional order moral claims against those who impose it. This suggestion implies, plausibly, that the more powerful states imposing the international order must shape it so that (insofar as is reasonably possible) all persons subjected to it have secure access to the objects of their human rights. If those states lived up to this responsibility, much of the current vast underfulfillment of human rights would be avoided.
“Globale Verteilungsgerechtigkeit” 2002.
“Economic Justice, National and Global” (Chinese) in Dushu 2002:1, and in Taishe 44; English text in Nicholas Bunnin, Qiu Renzong and Jiang Yi, eds.: Political Philosophy (Beijing: China Social Sciences Press 2010).
“Preempting Humanitarian Interventions” in Ian Carter and Mario Ricciardi, eds.: Freedom, Power and Political Morality: Essays for Felix Oppenheim (London: Palgrave 2001), 153–170; reprinted in Aleksandar Jokic, ed.:Humanitarian Intervention: Moral and Philosophical Issues (Peterborough: Broadview Press 2003), 93–108.
Abstract: This essay discusses four kinds of strategies for reducing the occasions on which humanitarian interventions look imperative and highlights particular reforms of our global order that would make it more encouraging of good government.
“Priorities of Global Justice” in Metaphilosophy 32/1–2 (January 2001), 6–24, and in Thomas Pogge, ed.: Global Justice (Oxford: Blackwell 2001), 6–23; abbreviated and updated reprint in David Held and Anthony McGrew, eds.: The Global Transformations Reader, 2nd edition (Cambridge: Polity Press 2003), 548–558; further updated in Tom L. Beauchamp, Norman E. Bowie, and Denis G. Arnold, eds.: Ethical Theory and Business, 8th edition (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall 2007), 712–721. Chinese Dutch
Abstract: One third of all human deaths are due to poverty-related causes, to malnutrition and to diseases that can be prevented or cured cheaply. Yet, our politicians, academics, and mass media show little concern for how such poverty might be reduced. They are more interested in possible military interventions to stop human rights violations in developing countries, even though such interventions produce smaller benefits (if any) at greater cost. This Western priority may be rooted in self-interest. But it engenders, and is sustained by, a deeply flawed moral presentation of global economic cooperation. The new global economic order imposed by the wealthy and powerful states aggravates global inequality and reproduces severe poverty on a massive scale. On any plausible understanding of our moral values, the eradication of such poverty is our foremost responsibility.
“Migration and Poverty” in Veit M. Bader, ed.: Citizenship and Exclusion (Houndmills: Macmillan 1997), 12–27; reprinted in Robert Goodin and Philip Pettit, eds.: Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Anthology (Oxford: Blackwell 2005), 710–720. German
Abstract: This essay argues that political efforts toward eradicating poverty in the developing countries should take precedence over political efforts to get more poor and oppressed persons admitted into our affluent societies. Efforts of both kinds are directed at morally worthy goals. But the former efforts are likely to be far more effective than the latter.
“Liberalism and Global Justice: Hoffmann and Nardin on Morality in International Affairs” in Philosophy and Public Affairs 15/1 (Winter 1986), 67–81.
Abstract: The essay argues for a conception of global justice that (a) is “liberal” in orientation and (b) focuses on “social institutions” (not on conduct and policies within some prevailing global regime). The two parts of my thesis are explained and defended against the background of two recent books. Terry Nardin’s Law, Morality and the Relations of States comes into conflict with the moral commitments of liberalism, while Stanley Hoffmann’s Duties Beyond Borders attacks the Rawlsian emphasis on social institutions.
“Justice: Philosophical Aspects” forthcoming in James D. Wright, ed.: The International Encyclopedia of Social and Behavioral Sciences, 2nd edition (Oxford: Elsevier 2015).
“The Progressive Potential of Human Rights” forthcoming in Susanne Kaul and David Kim, eds.: Imagining Human Rights (Berlin: de Gruyter 2015).
“Measuring Poverty: A Proposal,” authored with Scott Wisor, forthcoming in Matthew Adler and Marc Fleurbaey, eds.: Oxford Handbook of Well-Being and Public Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2015).
“Are We Violating the Human Rights of the World’s Poor? Responses to Four Critics” in Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal, 17:1 (2014), 74–87, http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1122&context=yhrdlj.
“Concluding Remarks: Inequality as a Threat to Allegiance” in Fiona Jenkins, Mark Nolan and Kim Rubenstein, eds.: Allegiance and Identity in a Globalized World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2014), 568–89.